Many, Many Days Away

Election season is upon us (again).

Well, not really. November 3, 2020 is still more than a year and a half away, and the Democratic Party has yet to even host its first presidential debate.

It is easy to get wrapped up in endless conversations about the next presidential election, and it could be entertaining to constantly speculate on election outcomes as that November date inches closer.

However, regardless of who the Democrats nominate, there is a simple fact of (recent) American history that, for better or worse, stacks the odds against them: incumbent presidents are quite difficult to remove from office.

To Be in Office…

1992. 27 years ago. That was the last time an incumbent president lost reelection. We will get into why George H.W. Bush was expelled from office later, but it is important to first recognize why the reelection of incumbents is nearly an American tradition in modern times.

The first advantage an incumbent president has is obvious – they are the president. They hold an immense public profile, and can impact the media narrative with a single speech, announcement, or tweet.

The bully pulpit can be a powerful weapon, but it is not until the opposition party actually nominates someone that they can have a comparable public heavyweight of their own.

Furthermore, the president (almost) always begins the race as the de facto nominee of their party. This is a massive advantage right away, as it enables incumbents to avoid a bruising primary fight – a fight which costs presidential campaigns both money and time.

Perhaps more importantly, primary fights can be extremely divisive, and party members can bolt the ticket in the general election if they are dissatisfied with the treatment of their preferred party candidate.

Presidents simply do not have this problem – they begin the cycle with a strong grip on their party apparatus. This is especially true in Donald Trump’s case, with all data pointing to the fact that the Republican Party will back him in almost all circumstances, at levels not before seen.

To Credit, (Or to Blame?)

But there’s more. While they do not like to admit it, presidents do not have a huge impact on many things in the United States in the long run, and the economy is one of them.

Of course, there are exceptions, especially during economic crises. For example, while there have been criticisms of the Obama stimulus package from across the political spectrum, most economists agree that it prevented the recession from being worse over the following years.

Similarly, presidents can take actions that hurt the economy in the short-run, and which can be directly attributed to them. The 1890 Tariff Act, signed into law by Benjamin Harrison, certainly benefited workers in the tin industry, but these benefits were outweighed by costs to consumers in the broader economy, and probably cost Harrison reelection.

These are important exceptions, but they are just that, exceptions. There are many more instances of presidents receiving credit or blame for something they (largely) had no control over.

For example, the tech-boom which heavily drove growth in the 1990s would likely have occurred regardless of the president at the time, but Bill Clinton’s high approval ratings were in part derived from it.

When It Actually Happened

None of this is to say that long-run economic growth is the only thing which determines a president’s reelection odds. Indeed, it can be argued that right now there are serious issues with the American economy regarding household wealth and worker wellbeing, which figures like the unemployment and growth rates fail to show.

What is more important to note, however, is this:

In the absence of serious other incidents which harm an incumbent’s reputation (particularly with their core supporters), and during times of relative economic prosperity, incumbents almost always win.

Donald Trump could be different in this case, but we’ll get to that. First, let’s look at the last four times an incumbent was defeated for reelection: 1992, 1980, 1976, and 1932.

Let’s address the most obvious example of an incumbent defeat first: 1932. Much of the presidency of the incumbent, Herbert Hoover, was marred by the Great Depression. Furthermore, the Republicans had controlled the White House for twelve years at the time of his defeat, and it historically has been difficult for a political party to be in power that long. Despite the massive landslide which carried Hoover into office in 1928, the president was swept out of office by Franklin Roosevelt in an even bigger win in 1932.

Next, 1976. First off, it must be noted that the president, Gerald Ford, was not a traditional incumbent. He had only been in office a brief time following the collapse of the Nixon presidency. Furthermore, Gerald Ford’s pardon of Richard Nixon severely hurt his reputation. Jimmy Carter, his opponent, ran a unique campaign which centered largely on “honest government,” an unusually potent message in the wake of Watergate. He used his reputation as someone completely outside of Washington during the Nixon years, as well as some homespun imagery, to ultimately win the election by a narrow margin.

Ironically, the next incumbent to lose reelection would be Carter himself four years later.

1980 is remembered as a watershed election for American conservatives, with the election of Ronald Reagan as president. But what many Reagan supporters would not like to admit is that while Reagan ran a vigorous campaign, there were factors outside of his control which certainly abetted his rise.

Most obvious here would be the Iranian hostage crisis, which severely dented Carter’s popularity. In addition, the weakening economy due to the energy crisis also softened Carter’s base of support and poll numbers. So here again we see very abnormal factors aligning to produce the defeat of an incumbent.

Now, for 1992. At first glance, this may seem like the hardest case to explain. George H.W. Bush’s popularity was sky-high after the Gulf War, and while there was a recession towards the latter half of his term, the economy was still fairly strong by historic standards.

So why did Bush go down? One theory states that with the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, there was a “refocus to home” in political discourse.

For Bush, whose more visible achievements and popularity were in the realm of foreign policy, this meant trouble, as the recession would have a harder political bite than otherwise. To top it all off, he was up against the charismatic Bill Clinton, who was able to capitalize on many Americans’ economic concerns, and win the election.

2020…?

So, we need to look at 2020 in the context of history.

While deeply flawed, the economy is nonetheless better than it was in 2008. Furthermore, the question of whether Trump himself is actually responsible for this economy is irrelevant (for political purposes), because history tells us that his reelection chances will be bolstered regardless.

So then we turn to the other factor: a set of actions or policies by the administration itself that could dent its popularity, in spite of the economy. With this, we arrive at perhaps the biggest factor which the 2020 election hinges on.

Polarization.

More specifically, the fact that if a plurality, or even a majority, of Americans are opposed to a specific policy of the administration, it does not matter. The president does not need one.

Instead, Trump can simply pursue policies and an agenda which fire up his own base to vote, and more specifically because of the Electoral College, to vote in the key states he needs to win.

This is perhaps best evidenced by Trump’s approval rating, which currently hovers in the low-forties. It is easy to think of this as evidence that a majority of Americans are against him, but if so, the question must be asked – does that majority of Americans vote?

Trump’s approval rating in 2016 was roughly the same as it is now, and he won.

What’s Next

About a year ago, I was listening to a panel of speakers at my own George Washington University. I’ll admit, I forgot what specific policy issue was being discussed at the time, but I’ll never forget the answer one speaker gave to a question I asked.

My question revolved around messaging, and was along the lines of: “What is the best way to change the minds of people who disagree with us on any given policy issue, in order to have a policy we want enacted?”

His response?

“I reject the premise of your question.” The speaker then went on to say that “it’s not about convincing the 80% of people who disagree with you to change their minds, it’s about convincing the 20% who do agree with you to vote.”

You may think at this point that I believe the Democrats are doomed, but that is not the case at all. Whoever the party nominates, however, will have some serious convincing to do, just not the kind that you may think.

They will need to methodically, forcefully push an agenda powerful enough to mobilize the many different groups making up the party to vote. They will need to persuade people to knock on doors, to make calls, and run an extremely disciplined campaign.

A strong majority of Americans disapprove of Donald Trump. But that alone does not guarantee his defeat. The Democratic nominee will face the gargantuan task of rallying that majority to the polls, and in the states where it matters most.